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RESIDENCY REQUIREMENTS FOR
MUNICIPALLY-FINANCED CONSTRUCTION
CONTRACTS AND THE DORMANT
COMMERCE POWER: WHITE V.
MASSACHUSETTS COUNCIL OF
CONSTRUCTION EMPLOYERS
State and local governments play an important role in the economic
development of their jurisdictions.' Some states and municipalities
may attempt to influence employment opportunities by enacting meas-
ures that provide employment preferences for their residents.2 In
1. States and cities actively promote economic growth. Most states and local gov-
ernments offer a package of incentives to attract and retain businesses. These incentives
include: I) Financial assistance, such as state or local revenue bond financing, state
loans, and other forms of low-cost financing; 2) tax exemptions on property and income
taxes (some states tie their tax credits to economically lagging areas and to the number
of employees hired by the business); and 3) special services, such as state supported
training and retraining of the unemployed, use of state university facilities, and state
programs to increase exports and to promote research and development. See THE
BOOK OF THE STATES 1980-81 492-96 (J. Gardner ed. 1980); THE BOOK OF THE
STATES 1978-79 491-95 (P. Albright ed. 1978).
There is substantial competition among states to attract businesses. See J. FESLER,
THE FIFrY STATES AND THEIR LOCAL GOVERNMENTS 148 (1976). For a summary of
state development programs, see Note, Survey of Current State Economic Development
Programs, 17 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 355 (1983).
2. There are two types of employment preference statutes. One type provides pref-
erential treatment for state or city residents for employment with state or municipal
government. The other type involves a hiring preference for resident state or city work-
ers imposed upon private contractors that wish to receive public works contracts. Note,
Construction Worker Residency Requirements: A Constitutional Response, 17 NEW ENG.
L. REV. 461, 463-64 (1981). Several states impose hiring preferences upon private con-
tractors. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 39-3-2 (1975); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 34-302
(1974); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 14-607 (1979); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 31-52 (1983); DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 29, § 6913 (1983); IDAHO CODE § 44-1001 (1977); ILL. REV. STAT. ch.
48, § 271 (1983); IOWA CODE ANN. § 73.3 (West 1973 & Supp. 1982); MASS. ANN.
LAWS ch. 149, § 26 (Michie/Law. Co-op. 1976); MiSS. CODE ANN. § 31-5-17 (1972);
MONT. CODE ANN. § 18-2-403 (1983); NEV. REV. STAT. § 338.130 (1979); N.M. STAT.
ANN. § 13-4-1 (1978); N.D. CENT. CODE § 43-07-20 (1978); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 61,
§ 10 (West 1963 & Supp. 1984); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 154 (Purdon 1964); S.D.
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White v. Massachusetts Council of Construction Employers,3 the United
States Supreme Court held that cities constitutionally may require pri-
vate contractors to reserve a certain percentage of jobs on city-financed
construction projects for city residents.4
In an effort to reduce unemployment in Boston,5 Mayor White is-
sued an executive order6 mandating that Boston residents perform at
least fifty percent of all work on city-financed or administered con-
struction projects.' The Massachusetts Council of Construction Em-
ployers, local construction unions, and local contractors challenged the
CODIFED LAWS ANN. § 5-19-6 (1980); UTAH CODE ANN. § 55-3-33 (1953); VT. STAT.
ANN. tit. 19, § 27 (1968); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 39.16.005 (1972 & Supp. 1984).
3. 406 U.S. 204 (1983).
4. The Court found no intrusion upon Congress' "dormant" commerce power. Id.
at 215. See infra notes 14-17 and accompanying text for discussion of the dormant
commerce power.
5. See Massachusetts Council of Constr. Employers v. Mayor of Boston, 384 Mass.
466, 472, 425 N.E.2d 346, 350 (1981). In October of 1981, construction workers faced
the highest unemployment rate of any occupation in the nation. U.S. BUREAU OF LA-
BOR STATISTICS, DEP'T OF LABOR 81-519 (Table A-5) (1981).
6. The order also applied to projects for which the city merely administered federal
funds. See infra note 7. The order affected approximately $54 million in federal funds,
including Urban Development Action Grants, 42 U.S.C. § 5318 (1982), Community
Development Block Grants, 42 U.S.C. § 5301 (1982), and Economic Development Ad-
ministration Grants, 42 U.S.C. § 3131 (1982). 460 U.S. at 212. Regulations implement-
ing these programs provide that low income persons residing in the area of the project
receive preferential employment opportunities. See 24 C.F.R. § 135.1(a)(2)(i) (1984);
id. § 570.307(m); 13 C.F.R. § 305.54(a) (1984).
The White Court, including the dissent, 460 U.S. at 215, concluded that these regula-
tions permit favoring local residents at project sites. Id. at 214.
7. The applicable portion of the mayor's executive order, enacted in Sept. 1979,
states the following:
1) On any construction project funded in whole or in part by City funds, or funds
which, in accordance with a federal grant or otherwise, the City expends or ad-
ministers, and to which the City is a signatory to the construction contract, the
worker hours on a craft-by-craft basis shall be performed in accordance with the
contract documents established herewith, as follows:
a. at least 50% by bona fide Boston residents;
b. at least 25% by minorities;
c. at least 10% by women.
384 Mass. at 467-68 n.4, 425 N.E.2d at 347-48 n.4.
The executive order comported with state policy. A Massachusetts statute provides
that:
In the employment of mechanics and apprentices, teamsters, chauffeurs and labor-
ers in the construction of public works by the commonwealth, or by a county, town
or district, or by persons contracting or subcontracting for such works, preference
shall first be given to citizens of the commonwealth. ...
MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 149, § 26 (Michie/Law Co-op. 1976). Mayor White invoked the
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executive order.' These groups alleged that the executive order was
repugnant to the commerce clause9 of the United States Constitution.I1
The Massachusetts Supreme Court agreed and found the executive or-
der unconstitutional.1 On appeal, the United States Supreme Court
reversed, finding no violation of the commerce clause. 12
The drafters of the Constitution created the commerce clause to pre-
vent the establishment of economic barriers between the states.1 3 The
commerce power authorizes Congress to regulate interstate com-
authority of Chapter 149 when he issued the executive order. Respondent's Brief at 3,
White v. Massachusetts Council of Constr. Employers, 460 U.S. 204 (1983).
8. Labor unions and construction firms oppose such trade barriers for several rea-
sons. Contractors, under these laws, no longer have a free hand in hiring employees and
may have to hire less qualified workers as a result of a quota for city residents. Boston's
executive order also clearly limits employment opportunities for non-resident construc-
tion workers. Finally, the effect of the quota may well extend to projects performed for
private firms. Contractors that perform private and public contracts will not want to
spend time and money to hire and fire new employees for every new project, and resi-
dency quotas may deter contractors from bidding at all. See, e.g.,-StTouis Post-Dis-
patch, Oct. 11, 1984, at 3A, col. 2 (voicing concerns of a labor leader about a proposed
public construction residency quota bill).
9. In addition, the Council claimed that the order violated the privileges and immu-
nities clause (U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 1: "The Citizens of Each State shall be
entitled to all Privileges and Immunities of Citizens of the several States."), the contract
clause (U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1: "No State shall. . . pass any. . .Law impairing
the Obligation of Contracts .. "), and the due process clause (U.S. CONST. amend.
XIV, § 1: "Nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law...."). 384 Mass. at 470, 425 N.E.2d at 349.
10. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. Under the commerce clause, Congress has the
power "to regulate Commerce ... among the several states." Id. See infra notes 13-17
and accompanying text.
11. 384 Mass. at 466, 425 N.E.2d at 346. The court found the Massachusetts pref-
erence statute (see supra note 7) violative of the privileges and immunities clause. Id. at
478, 425 N.E.2d at 353. The court did not decide whether the executive order violated
the privileges and immunities clause. Id. at 478, 425 N.E.2d at 354.
Under the commerce clause claim, the fact that in-state residents are burdened is
immaterial so long as some out-of-state residents also are burdened. Dean Milk Co. v.
City of Madison, 340 U.S. 349, 354 n.4 (1951). The plaintiff contractors included 12
non-Massachusetts residents. Respondent's Brief at 3 n.4, White v. Massachusetts
Council of Constr. Employers, 460 U.S. 204 (1983).
12. 460 U.S. 204 (1983).
,. Justice Cardozo once stated the source of the commerce clause as follows: "The
Constitution was framed under the domination of a political philosophy less parochial
in range. It was framed upon the theory that the peoples of the several states must sink
or swim together, and that in the long run prosperity and salvation are in union and not
division." Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, 294 U.S. 511, 523 (1934).
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merce.14 The Supreme Court's interpretation of the commerce clause
also recognizes a "dormant" commerce power. I5 The dormant com-
merce clause requires courts to invalidate state or municipal laws that
unreasonably burden the flow of interstate commerce 16 even if Con-
gress has not regulated the subject matter covered by the state or mu-
nicipal statute.17
In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, state courts
found no commerce clause limitations on states acting in a "proprie-
tary" capacity.18 Proprietary actions consist of state activity as buyer
14. For a general discussion of Congress' regulatory power over commerce, see L.
TRIBE, AMERICAN CONsrITUTIONAL LAW §§ 5-1 to 5-87 (1978).
15. See Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 209 (1824). The dormant com-
merce power originated with the so-called "Madisonian interpretation" of the Constitu-
tion that Chief Justice Marshall espoused in Gibbons. This interpretation is premised on
the view that the Articles of Confederation failed largely because of trade wars among
states. The Madisonian interpretation advocated the notion that Congress has authority
over economic matters affecting more than one state. See L. TRIBE, supra note 14, at
322.
The Constitution contains no language forbidding state interference with interstate
commerce. The Supreme Court, however, has found that only Congress may regulate
certain areas of commerce. See Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299,
319 (1851). For the commerce clause effectively to reduce economic barriers between
the states, the Cooley Court concluded that it must prevent states from impeding the
free flow of interstate commerce and recognized the need for uniform national regula-
tions in certain areas. Id.
The Supreme Court has employed the commerce clause to strike down state legisla-
tion impairing interstate commerce. See, e.g., Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison, 340
U.S. 349 (1951) (city ordinance forbidding local sale of milk unless locally pasteurized
held invalid); H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. DuMond, 336 U.S. 525 (1949) (a state may not
prevent a milk processor serving another state from establishing a new plant within the
state's borders); Southern Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761 (1945) (state regulation of
train length declared invalid); Wabash, St. L. & Pac. Ry. Co. v. Illinois, 118 U.S. 557
(1886) (state law regulating interstate railway rates charged to state customers declared
invalid). For additional perspectives on the development of the dormant commerce
clause, see Eule, Laying the Dormant Commerce Clause to Rest, 91 YALE L.J. 425
(1982); Tushnet, Rethinking the Dormant Commerce Clause, 1979 Wis. L. REV. 125
(1979).
16. See, e.g., Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137 (1970) (invalidating state
restriction on out-of-state packing of cantalopes).
17. See, e.g., Great At. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Cottrell, 424 U.S. 366, 371 (1976) (reci-
procity requirement for sale of milk from outside state); Freeman v. Hewit, 329 U.S.
249, 252 (1946) (state taxation of securities).
18. See, eg., City of Denver v. Bossie, 83 Colo. 329, 266 P. 214 (1928) (state may
require that all bidders on public works contracts use products made in the state when-
ever possible); In re Gemmill, 20 Idaho 732, 119 P. 298 (1911) (state may require that
all printing done for the state government occur within the state); State ex rel. Collins v.
Senatobia Blank Book Stationery Co., 115 Miss. 254, 76 So. 258 (1917) (state may for-
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or seller of goods or services in the marketplace.1 9 Like any other par-
ticipant in the marketplace, the state retains the right to choose freely
its bargaining partners. 20
In American Yearbook Co. v. Askew,2 1 a federal district court applied
the proprietary action doctrine2 2 to uphold Florida's claim of immu-
nity from commerce clause restraints when the state acted as a pur-
chaser.2 3 The Supreme Court affirmed the decision in a memorandum
24opinion. In American Yearbook, a publishing company challenged a
Florida statute that required publishers working on state contracts to
conduct their printing in Florida.25 The publisher asserted that the
statute clearly burdened interstate commerce.2 6 The district court,
however, found that no commerce clause restraints applied because the
bid counties from buying books from non-resident sellers); Hersey v. Nelson, 47 Mont.
132, 131 P. 30 (1913) (newspapers holding public printing contracts they cannot per-
form must sublet the contract to an in-state printer); Tribune Printing & Binding Co. v.
Barnes, 7 N.D. 591, 75 N.W. 904 (1898) (county may use only resident county print-
ers).
For a discussion of these cases, see Note, Home-State Preferences in Public Con-
tracting: A Study in Economic Balkanization, 58 IowA L. REv. 576 (1973); Comment,
In-State Preferences in Public Contracting: States' Rights versus Economic Sectionalism,
49 U. COLO. L. REv. 205, 216-19 (1978).
19. These proprietary actions are similar to those in which an individual or business
engages. Governmental action, on the other hand, involves traditional governmental
activities, such as police protection and regulation of the citizenry. For a discussion of
the governmental-proprietary distinction in commerce clause analysis, see Wells & Hel-
lerstein, The Government-Proprietary Distinction in Constitutional Law, 66 VA. L. REV.
1073, 1121-25 (1980); Comment, supra note 18, at 205, 219.
20. See, e.g., Tribune Printing & Binding Co. v. Barnes, 7 N.D. 591, 75 N.W. 904
(1898). The court found no reason to forbid the state from doing that which an individ-
ual or a business may legally do when purchasing goods and contracting for services.
Id. at 597, 75 N.W. at 906. This rationale, however, fails to consider that states' polit-
ical considerations may affect, or even guide, their actions. See Note, supra note 18, at
584.
21. 339 F. Supp. 719 (M.D. Fla.), aff'd mem., 409 U.S. 904 (1972).
22. The "proprietary action doctrine" refers to the state's immunity from commerce
clause restraints when acting in a propriety capacity. See supra notes 18-20 and accom-
panying text.
23. 339 F. Supp. at 721-23.
24. 409 U.S. 904 (1972).
25. The statute provides: "All public printing of this state shall be done in the
state .. " FLA. STAT. ANN. § 283.03 (West 1974).
26. 339 F. Supp. at 723. The publisher engaged in the business of printing year-
books for schools and universities. Because the publisher lacked printing facilities in
Florida, it could not obtain a contract to print yearbooks for state-owned universities.
Id. at 720.
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state purchased services in a "proprietary capacity."27 As a result of
this "immunity" from the commerce clause, the state could impose
conditions upon its purchases.2" Hence, Florida could restrict its
purchases to those companies that perform their printing in Florida,
despite the fact that out-of-state publishers were subject to
discrimination.29
In Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp.,3 the Supreme Court first ad-
dressed directly the issue of state immunity from commerce clause re-
straints. In Hughes, the Maryland Legislature attempted to rid state
highways of abandoned automobiles31 by offering a cash bounty to
scrap processors for every abandoned vehicle that the processors con-
verted into scrap.32 To receive the bounty, the state required proof of
ownership of the automobile.33 Five years later the legislature
amended the statute to require more exacting ownership documenta-
tion from out-of-state processors than that required of in-state proces-
27. Id. at 725. The court explicitly stated the reasons for this exception to com-
merce clause restraints as follows: "When the state exercises its proprietary or business
power, however, it is subject to no more limitation than a private individual or corpora-
tion would be in transacting the same business. . . the letting of public contracts, par-
ticularly those providing for internal needs of government, is a proprietary function."
Id. The court based its holding on Field v. Barber Asphalt Paving Co., 194 U.S. 618
(1904) (upholding a municipal ordinance specifying that the city use a particular kind of
asphalt in paving city streets); Atkin v. Kansas, 191 U.S. 207 (1903) (upholding the
states' right to prescribe working conditions for private firms working on public con-
tracts); and MacMillan Co. v. Johnson, 269 F. 28 (E.D. Mich. 1920) (upholding a state
statute that dictated conditions under which a book dealer could sell textbooks to public
schools). 339 F. Supp. at 721-24. In addition, the court mentioned state cases uphold-
ing statutes that required printers to perform state or municipal printing contracts
within the state or city. Id. at 724. See supra note 18.
A recent Seventh Circuit case challenges American Yearbook's implicit holding that
states can require local governments to employ in-state printers. See W.C.M. Window
Co. v. Bernardi, 730 F.2d 486, 495 (7th Cir. 1984). For a discussion of W.CM. Win-
dow, see infra note 71.
28. 339 F. Supp. at 725. See also People ex rel. Holland v. Bleigh Constr. Co., 61
I11. 2d 258, 335 N.E.2d 469 (1975), where the Illinois Supreme Court upheld a law that
required the state to hire Illinois residents for all public construction projects unless
Illinois laborers are not available. The court relied on American Yearbook, finding the
state's action immune from the commerce clause. Id. at 275, 335 N.E.2d at 479.
29. 339 F. Supp. at 725.
30. 426 U.S. 794 (1976).
31. Id. at 796.
32. Id. at 797.
33. Id. at 798.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol28/iss1/13
RESIDENCY REQUIREMENTS
sors.34 The Court found that the amendment effectively denied out-of-
state scrap processors the opportunity to collect the bounty.35 A Vir-
ginia scrap processor who had received thousands36 of bounties from
Maryland challenged the constitutionality of the amendment on com-
merce clause grounds. The plaintiff contended that the amendment
unlawfully burdened interstate commerce.37 The Court, however,
found that the amendment did not warrant commerce clause scrutiny
because the state acted as a "market participant." Therefore, as a re-
sult of its market participant status, Maryland could favor its own
residents.38
The Supreme Court applied the Hughes analysis in Reeves, Inc. v.
Stake.39 Reeves upheld the policy of a state-owned cement plant that,
in the event of a cement shortage, limited sales to South Dakota resi-
dents." The Court found that the state acted as a market partici-
pant;4 1 consequently, it found an analysis of the burden on interstate
commerce unnecessary.42 In addition, the Court identified "state sov-
ereignty' ' 13 and states' rights to choose freely their bargaining partners
34. Id. at 800-01.
35. Id. at 803 n.13.
36. During the six months before the amendment became effective, the Virginia
scrap processor received 14,253 abandoned automobile hulks from Maryland. In the six
months following the effective date of the amendment, the number of hulks processed
by the Virginia processor declined by almost one-third. Id. at 801 n. 11.
37. Id. at 802. The plaintiff claimed that the amendment "burdened" the flow of
automobile hulks, eligible for a bounty, across state lines. Id
38. Id. at 810. The Court stated that "nothing in the purposes animating the Com-
merce Clause prohibits a State, in the absence of congressional action, from participat-
ing in the market and exercising the right to favor its own citizens over others." Id.
For comments on the Court's analysis, see Wells & Hellerstein, supra note 19, at 1131-
33; Note, State Purchasing Activity Excluded from Commerce Clause Review-Hughes
v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 18 B.C. IND. & COM. L. REv. 893 (1977); Note, Proprietary
Powers: A New Policy Tool for the States?,' 31 U. MIAMI L. REV. 729 (1977). These
articles suggest that, in Hughes, the Court implicitly accepted the proprietary action
doctrine. Hughes, however, failed to make any reference to American Yearbook.
39. 447 U.S. 429 (1980).
40. Id. at 430. The state built the plant in response to local cement shortages. Id.
41. Id at 440.
42. Id. at 436. Justice Powell, dissenting, stated that the issue the Court should
address is whether the state has undertaken integral governmental operations in an area
of traditional governmental functions or whether it has participated in the marketplace
as a private firm. Id. at 449-50 (Powell, J., dissenting). Justice Powell stated that if the
latter applied, a determination of the burden on interstate commerce is necessary. Id.
43. Id. at 438. The Court cited National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833
(1976), which the Court handed down on the same day as Hughes. National League of
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as the rationale for the states' market participant immunity from the
commerce clause.'
In White v. Massachusetts Council of Construction Employers,45 the
Supreme Court first confronted the issue of whether a city may limit
the percentage of work performed by nonresident employees of private
contractors working on construction projects funded wholly by the
city.46 The Boston executive order47 differed from the statutes at issue
in Hughes and Reeves because the mayor's order imposed conditions on
the contractual relationship between private contractors and their em-
ployees,48 and not merely on parties dealing directly with the state.49
The White Court found, nevertheless, that the "market participant ex-
emption"5 applied to the executive order.51
Cities stands as a landmark case because of its "re-emphasis" of state sovereignty. The
National League of Cities Court held that Congress may not invoke the commerce
power to regulate a state government's "integral operations in areas of traditional gov-
ernmental functions." Id at 852. National League of Cities, however, has been ex-
pressly overruled in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 105 S. Ct.
1005 (1985), by a 5-4 vote.
44. 447 U.S. at 438-39. Although the Court characterized the doctrine as "market
participation," this concept developed from the proprietary action cases. See supra
notes 18-20 and accompanying text.
45. 460 U.S. 204 (1983).
46. IdL at 209. The Court also addressed the issue of whether the city can apply
such a policy to projects funded partly by the federal government through Urban Devel-
opment Action Grants (UDAGs). See supra note 6. It found that the federal statute
was in "harmony" with the executive order. Id. at 213. Both the majority and the
dissent concluded that the order is constitutional as applied to projects involving federal
funds. Id. at 215. As a result, no dormant commerce clause issue arose because of the
existence of congressional approval. Id. See supra notes 13-17 and accompanying text.
47. See supra note 7.
48. The dissent asserted that Boston imposed conditions on the relationship be-
tween private parties. 460 U.S. at 213 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). The majority noted
the dissent's interpretation of the order, but failed to provide an alternative interpreta-
tion. Id. at 211 n.7.
49. The statutes at issue in Hughes and Reeves involved conditions on private busi-
nesses that deal directly with the state. See Note, supra note 2, at 491-92. In Hughes,
Maryland imposed the conditions for receiving a bounty on the scrap processors, who
dealt directly with the state to collect their bounties. See supra notes 30-38 and accom-
panying text. In Reeves, South Dakota merely refused to sell its concrete to out-of-state
buyers that sought to purchase its cement. See supra notes 39-44 and accompanying
text.
50. 460 U.S. at 215. The market participant exemption doctrine holds that when
states or cities enter the marketplace as buyers or sellers, they are immune from com-
merce clause scrutiny. The doctrine evolved from the proprietary action cases that
exempted states from commerce clause scrutiny when states acted as market partici-
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Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority, employed the analysis of
Hughes and Reeves to determine whether the Boston executive order
violated the commerce clause.5 2 He stated that the only issue facing
the Court was whether Boston acted as a market participant.5 3 The
pants. See supra notes 18-29 and accompanying text. The Hughes Court adopted the
term "market participant" in defining the states' exemption from the commerce clause.
See supra note 38 and accompanying text. The White Court employed the term "mar-
ket participant" in describing the Hughes precedent. 460 U.S. at 206.
51. 460 U.S. at 214-15. The New Jersey Supreme Court came to the same conclu-
sion in a factually similar case. See United Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council v. Camden,
88 N.J. 317, 443 A.2d 148 (1982), rev'd on other grounds, 104 S. Ct. 1020 (1984). In
that case, the city of Camden required that 40% of the labor force on city-funded public
works projects be city residents. Id. at 321, 443 A.2d at 149. The New Jersey court,
after noting Hughes and Reeves, stated that if the city conducted its own construction
work, it could require that all employees be city residents. Id. at 340, 443 A.2d at 159.
See infra note 64. The court further stated that the city retains the power to prefer its
residents when it purchases "construction services" from contractors. 88 N.J. at 338-
40, 443 A.2d at 159. The majority in White made the same argument in a footnote,
stating that "everyone affected by the order is, in an informal sense, 'working for the
city.'" 460 U.S. at 211 n.7.
52. 460 U.S. at 208.
53. Although the privileges and immunities clause, see supra note 9, was not argued,
and, thus, not an issue in White, the commerce clause and the privileges and immunities
clause share the common function of preventing state protectionism and interstate rival-
ries. See Note, supra note 2, at 494. In Hicklin v. Orbeck, 437 U.S. 518 (1978), the
Supreme Court invalidated an Alaska statute favoring state residents on privileges and
immunities clause grounds. White, 460 U.S. at 211. The statute required that Alaska
residents have preference over non-residents in all work connected with oil and gas
leases to which the state was a party. Id. The Hicklin Court noted that the commerce
clause and the privileges and immunities clause are "mutually reinforcing" because of
their shared vision of federalism. 437 U.S. at 531-32. The Court cited dormant com-
merce clause cases to support the privileges and immunities analysis. Id. at 532. For a
comparison of the commerce clause and the privileges and immunities clause as means
to invalidate resident employment quotas, see Note, supra note 2, at 494-97; Comment,
Hicklin v. Orbeck, 12 AKRON L. REV. 346, 358 (1978).
In a case decided after White, the Supreme Court applied the privileges and immuni-
ties clause to a residency requirement for workers employed by contractors working on
city-financed construction projects. See United Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council v.
Mayor of Camden, 104 S. Ct. 1020 (1984). In United Building, the Court acknowl-
edged that, under White, these residency requirements did not violate the commerce
clause. Id. at 1028. The Court found, however, that the privileges and immunities
clause applies to discrimination based on municipal residency. Id. at 1027. In addition,
the privileges and immunities clause protects an out-of-state resident's interest in em-
ployment by private contractors undertaking public works projects in another state. Id.
at 1029. The Court did not invalidate the Camden ordinance; it remanded the case to
determine whether the ordinance was "carefully tailored" to counteract the city's unem-
ployment problem. Id. at 1030. Whether these residency requirements are sufficiently
tailored to the municipal unemployment problem is uncertain. Therefore, it is unclear
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majority found that some limits exist on the market participant exemp-
tion when a state or city places restrictions on parties that never engage
in direct dealings with the state or local government.5 4 Although the
majority declined to delineate the limits of the market participant ex-
emption,5" the Court held that the exemption covered the Boston exec-
utive order because the city acted like a "major participant" in the
construction projects funded by the city. 6 Justice Rehnquist stated
that employees of private contractors performing city contracts effec-
tively were city employees. 7 Thus, the majority interpreted the scope
of Hughes and Reeves to include situations when a municipality acts as
a "major participant" in a particular economic activity.
Justice Blackmun dissented, criticizing the majority's interpretation
of Hughes and Reeves." Justice Blackmun asserted that the city order
dictated to private contractors which class of employees those contrac-
tors must hire.59 He concluded that the order constituted a regulation
of the marketplace, and therefore failed to fall within the scope of
Hughes and Reeves.'
whether the privileges and immunities clause will preclude ordinances such as the one
at issue in White.
"Durational residency requirements"-those that distinguish among citizens accord-
ing to their length of residency-implicate fourteenth amendment equal protection
rights. In United Building, the City of Camden had originally adopted a one-year resi-
dency requirement for all persons that desired employment on city-financed construc-
tion projects as city residents. 104 S. Ct. at 1024. The City, however, later deleted the
requirement and mooted the plaintiff's equal protection claim. Id. at 1025. For a com-
prehensive discussion of durational residency requirements and their validity under the
fourteenth amendment equal protection clause, see Comment, Durational Residency Re-
quirements and the Equal Protection Clause. Zobel v. Williams, 25 WASH. U.J. URB. &
CONTEMp. L. 329 (1983).
54. 466 U.S. at 211 n.7.
55. Id. The Court, however, concluded that "the Commerce Clause does not re-
quire the city to stop at the boundary of formal privity of contract." Id.
56. Id
57. Id. The Court stated that everyone affected by the order is, in an informal
sense, "working for the city." Id.
58. Id. at 217-23 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justice White joined in dissent.
59. Id at 218-19 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justice Blackmun distinguished a
seller's or purchaser's simple choice of a bargaining partner from an attempt to govern
private economic relationships. Id He stated that "the power to dictate to another
those with whom he may deal is viewed with suspicion and closely limited in the con-
text of purely economic relations." Id.
60. Id at 220 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justice Blackmun contended that
"[a]ttempts directly to constrict private economic choices through contractual condi-
tions [imposed by the state] are particularly akin to regulation because, unlike simple
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol28/iss1/13
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In support of his contention that the order went beyond the reach of
the market participant exemption, Justice Blackmun examined the ra-
tionale behind the exemption as expressed in Reeves.61 For Justice
Blackmun, Hughes and Reeves involved only the states' right to choose
their own bargaining partners, and therefore were distinguishable from
White. 62  He asserted that, in White, the city no longer acted like a
private business because the executive order imposed restraints on
dealings between private contractors and their employees.63 In addi-
tion, Justice Blackmun maintained that state sovereignty interests did
not extend to regulating conditions of private hiring."4 From this anal-
ysis, Justice Blackmun concluded that the city order was not within the
market participant exemption. Moreover, he found that the order dis-
criminated against interstate commerce, and therefore was repugnant
to the commerce clause.65
White appears to expand the market participant exemption as ap-
plied in Hughes and Reeves. The Supreme Court concluded that a city
is a market participant rather than a market regulator even when the
city requires private contractors to hire a certain percentage of city
refusals to deal but like conventional market regulation, they threaten to extend their
regulatory impact well beyond the transaction in which the State has an interest." Id.
He contended that the effect of the mayor's order was identical to a market regulation
requiring such quotas. Id.
61. Id. at 218-22 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). See supra notes 43-44 and accompany-
ing text. Note that Justice Blackmun authored the Reeves opinion. Justice Blackmun,
however, neglected to consider the third rationale that he propounded for the market
participant exemption. In Reeves, he contended that "competing considerations in cases
involving state proprietary action will be subtle, complex, politically charged and diffi-
cult to assess under traditional Commerce Clause analysis." 447 U.S. at 339. He con-
cluded that Congress could deal with the conflicting interests more effectively than the
Court. Id. The majority mentioned this rationale behind the exemption, but did not
apply the rationale in its analysis. 460 U.S. at 207 n.3.
62. 460 U.S. at 218-29 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
63. Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting). See supra note 59. One district court interpreted
White "to hold that, no matter the commercial context or the manner of its acting,
when the state itself is merchant or customer the Commerce Clause does not apply."
Shayne Bros., Inc. v. District of Columbia, 592 F. Supp. 1128, 1133 (D.D.C. 1984).
64. 460 U.S. at 221 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justice Blackmun, however, found
that under McCarthy v. Philadelphia Civil Serv. Comm'n, 424 U.S. 645 (1976), the city
could limit its own hiring to city residents. 460 U.S. at 217 n.2. State sovereignty
considerations limit federal interference with the hiring policies of state and local gov-
ernments. See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
65. 460 U.S. at 223-25 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justice Blackmun found the ex-
ecutive order a "protectionist measure," and therefore per se invalid under City of Phil-
adelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 624 (1978). 460 U.S. at 223.
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residents on city-financed projects.66 The Court, in emphasizing that
Boston was a major participant in the construction projects,67 focused
on the degree of the city's economic participation in determining
whether to apply the market participant exemption. In White, the ma-
jority determined that full funding of the construction projects by the
city constituted sufficient involvement to employ the market partici-
pant exemption.68 White, however, failed to delineate when a city's
involvement in economic activity becomes that of a market regulator. 69
White does not misrepresent the Hughes and Reeves precedents be-
cause those cases provided no guidance in defining the reach of the
market participant exemption.7" The majority opinion, however, is un-
66. See supra notes 48-51 and accompanying text.
67. See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
68. The Court expressly limited its holding to projects wholly funded by the city.
460 U.S. at 209. It held that the respondents failed to offer evidence showing that city
and private funds were used jointly. Id. The Court, however, stated that the executive
order applied to instances of joint funding. Id. at 208-09. The fact that the city funded
the entire project is crucial. The city may fail to reach the status of a "major partici-
pant" in the projects if private funds play a significant role in project funding. Thus, the
executive order may not survive judicial scrutiny if applied to projects with a large
amount of private funding.
69. See supra note 55 and accompanying text. The Supreme Court clarified some of
the limits on the market participant doctrine in South-Central Timber Dev. Inc. v.
Wunnicke, 104 S. Ct. 2237 (1984). In South-Central Timber, the Court concluded that
the market participant doctrine is not "carte blanche" to impose any conditions that the
state has the economic power to dictate. Id. at 2245. Furthermore, the doctrine does
not validate any requirement merely because the state imposes it upon a party with
whom it is in "contractual privity." Id. The Court.limited the doctrine to permit state-
imposed conditions that have a regulatory effect only on the particular market in which
the state is a participant. Id. at 2245-46. Therefore, Alaska could not require lumber
companies that purchase timber from the state to process that timber in-state, because
Alaska did not participate in the lumber-processing market. Id. at 2246-47.
In Western Oil and Gas Ass'n v. Cory, 726 F.2d 1340 (9th Cir. 1984), the Ninth
Circuit declined to apply the market participant exemption. Oil companies contested a
California tax based on the volume of oil passing over state-owned submerged lands on
commerce clause grounds. California argued that it was merely a market participant
because some submerged lands are owned by private interests, therefore, making the
state like any other property owner. Id. at 1342. The court held, however, that because
oil companies cannot move their wells and California owns its submerged lands in a
sovereign capacity, California is a market regulator and not just another competitor.
Id. at 1343. The importance of city contracts for the construction industry is somewhat
analogous to the position of oil companies in Cory who must funnel their oil over state-
owned submerged lands.
70. Hughes and Reeves both found that the state acted as a market participant, but
these cases dealt with a situation where state-regulated parties had direct dealings with
the state. See supra note 49.
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satisfactory as a matter of public policy. The majority's failure to de-
fine the scope of the market participant exemption will enable cities
and states to utilize their market participant status as a pretext for reg-
ulating private parties. Courts may invoke the term "market partici-
pant" merely as a label, without examining the nature and effect of the
state's7 1 or city's activity. Thus, cities and states may justify discrimi-
natory regulations by claiming that they act as market participants.72
The dissenting opinion's analysis of the market participant exemp-
tion reflects a sounder policy. By rendering the market participant ex-
emption inapplicable in situations where the state or city regulates
dealings between private parties, the dissent effectively limited the
scope of the exemption. The dissent's focus on the nature and effect of
71. In a case decided subsequent to White, the Seventh Circuit held that a state
participating in the market may enact laws favoring state residents. See W.C.M. Win-
dow Co. Inc. v. Bernardi, 730 F.2d 486, 494 (7th Cir. 1984). The statute at issue re-
quired contractors involved in any state or municipal public works project to employ
only Illinois residents, unless the contractor and the contracting officer found that Illi-
nois residents are unavailable. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, § 269 (1981). The court
found, however, that Illinois no longer acted as a market participant when it dictated to
local governments who they must engage in business with. 730 F.2d at 495. Therefore,
the court concluded that the Illinois residence preference statute violated the commerce
clause by forcing third parties, the local governments, to favor state residents. Id. at
496. Noting that the Supreme Court summarily affirmed a state law that required local
governments to have all their printing done in the state in American Yearbook, see supra
notes 21-29 and accompanying text, the court nevertheless found that Illinois acted as a
market regulator. Id. at 495.
72. Since 1980, several states have tried to justify discriminatory statutes by assert-
ing that the state is a market participant, even in defending statutes in which the state
clearly acted as a regulator. See, e.g., New Eng. Power Co. v. New Hampshire, 455
U.S. 331 (1982) (Court rejected state's argument that, in a statute giving state residents
preferred access to electricity produced by private in-state utilities, the state acted as a
market participant); Shayne Bros. Inc. v. Prince George's County, 556 F. Supp. 182 (D.
Md. 1983) (county argued that an ordinance forbidding unauthorized dumping of out-
of-state trash in county landfills is valid because the county acted as a market partici-
pant; the court rejected the argument); Archer Daniels Midland Co. v. State, 315
N.W.2d 597 (Minn. 1982) (state acts as a market regulator, rather than a market par-
ticipant, in giving a tax reduction for gasahol produced within the state); Gould v. Wis-
consin Dep't of Indus., Labor & H. Rel. 576 F. Supp. 1290 (W.D. Wis. 1983) (state
relied on market participant doctrine to justify a law barring employers that have three
or more adverse NRLB findings from conducting business in Wisconsin). The use of
the market participant argument in areas far removed from state market participation
shows the need for more guidance by the Supreme Court.
Following White, some courts have upheld the policies of state or county owned land-
fills that exclude refuse from other jurisdictions under the "market participant" doc-
trine. See Shayne Bros., Inc. v. District of Columbia, 592 F. Supp. 1128, 1133-34
(D.D.C. 1984); County Comm'rs of Charles County v. Stevens, 299 Md. 203, -, 473
A.2d 12, 19 (1984).
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the city's activity73 more sharply defines and limits the doctrine than
does the majority opinion's vague focus upon the significance of the
city's economic involvement in the activity. Applying the dissenting
opinion will prevent states and cities from masking discriminatory reg-
ulations in the guise of market participation.
White permits states and cities to favor their own residents in any
economic activity in which the state or city is a major market partici-
pant. When states or cities employ private firms to provide goods or
services, they can require the firms to implement employment quotas
for state or city residents as a condition to receiving the contract. Sig-
nificant territorial barriers in the labor market may arise if other cities
or states enact statutes similar to the Boston executive order.7 4 A
proliferation of employment quotas for residents of particular jurisdic-
tions will cause dislocation among employees in industries that are
heavily dependent on government contracts. Dislocation of workers
based on residency clearly falls within the scope of the evils that the
commerce clause sought to prevent.
Michael W. Straus
73. See 460 U.S. at 220 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
74. One commentator stated that general immunity for states as market participants
could exacerbate trade barriers between states, which could have serious impacts on
interstate commerce. See L. TRIBE, supra note 14, at 337.
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